I. Introduction
On 2 November 2012, the seventeen members of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FF A) 1 adopted a new treaty providing for cooperation in fisheries surveillance and law enforcement activities. The Agreement on Strengthening Implementation of the Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region (the Agreement), 2 is clearly underpinned by a common purpose; the creation . of a strong but flexible mechanism that actively encourages cooperation between the Parties and maximises the reach and effectiveness of their jurisdiction and assets in the conduct of fisheries surveillance and enforcement. It also reflects a commitment to the use and continuous development of new tools, technologies and laws to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and a recognition of the potential benefits of closer cooperation and information-sharing in relation to both fisheries and broader law enforcement activities.
This Agreement is not 'just another fisheries treaty'. As overfishing in a number of the world's oceans makes the rich tuna resources of the Pacific region increasingly attractive to global fishing fleets, this Agreement is a timely mechanism to enhance its members' individual strength through collective cooperation. It is a product of the context and process of its negotiation and adoption; it reflects the high-level political commitment of Pacific Island Leaders to these issues, and the cooperative multilateralism that has been integral to the success of the FF A for more than thirty years. More than that, however, the Agreement introduces a number of modem and innovative concepts intended to provide its Parties with the widest possible range of opportunities for cooperation, consistent with international law and reflecting the practical realities of fisheries enforcement in the Pacific region. Against the backdrop of Pacific fisheries, this of the global tuna catch (largely in the ·exclusive economic zones of the coastal states). 3 The coastal states are predominantly small, developing Pacific island countries, for which the fishery resources are of vital significance to ensure sustainable development and economic security. 4 However, these resources are also eagerly sought after by distant water fishing nations, which come from around the world to fish for tuna and other highly migratory species in the rich fishing grounds of the western and central Pacific. Under these circumstances, effective domestic and (given the highly migratory nature of these species, which move through numerous areas of national jurisdiction and high seas) regional regulation is essential to ensure the long-term sustainability of the fishery and the successful development of domestic fishing industries. But with enormous maritime zones to police and only limited assets available, the . Pacific island countries struggle to undertake the surveillance and enforcement activities necessary to effectively protect these resources.
Fisheries enforcement is an inherently difficult activity, due in no small part to the jurisdictional gaps and overlaps that exist in the law of the sea. In the Exclusive Economic Zone, there is the potential for conflict between the right of foreign vessels to navigate freely and the coastal state's right to regulate fishing activities, while on the high seas it is necessary to appropriately balance the duty to cooperate in the conservation and management of fishery resources with the freedoms of fishing and navigat~on, and the pri?'acy of ~ag stat~ jurisdiction.
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I~ addition to these legal difficult1es, fo~ de: elop1n.g, countries, particularly those with . ~uch vast maritime zones as the Pacific islands, the large area of ocean space relative to the land area, the migratory nature of fleets and fisheries resources, lack of financial and technical resources and skilled manpower compound the problem' of fisheries enforcement. 6 It is not surprising, then, that cooperation on fisheries issues has been a key focus in this region since the very first meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum (then the South Pacific Forum) in 1971.7 In 1977, noting the need to establish 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones, harmonise fisheries policies in the region, and adopt a coordinated approach in relation to distant water fishing countries, Pacific Island leaders adopted the Declaration on the Law of the Sea and the Regional Fisheries Agency. 8 The Declaration recognised the common interests of the Pacific Island Countries with respect to fisheries, and the need for a regional fisheries agency to advise on and coordinate policies and activities (including with respect to surveillance and enforcement) in order to secure the maximum benefits from these resources.
The mandate provided by this Declaration was implemented and realised very quickly, with the adoption and entry into force of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention9 (the FFA Convention) in 1979. The FFA Convention established the Forum Fisheries Agency, which consists of the Forum Fisheries Committee (comprising representatives of all the member countries) to provide policy and administrative guidance and direction, and a permanent Secretariat (located in Honiara, Solomon Islands) to provide advice and assistance to the The objective of the Niue Treaty has been described as promoting 'maximum effectiveness in regional or sub-regional surveillance and enforcement through cooperation between countries on a joint or reciprocal basis'. 18 In order to maximise the potential for cooperation, and the effective use of enforcement assets, Article VI of the Niue Treaty provides for the Parties to establish subsidiary agreements or arrangements, by which they can cooperate in the provision of personnel,. vessels and aircraft, and agree to undertake fisheries surveillance and law enforcement activities in each other's waters. It also requires Parties, to the extent permitted by their national laws and regulations, to provide relevant information {including information about the location and movement of foreign fishing vessels, foreign fishing vessel licensing, and fisheries surveillance and enforcement activities) to the FF A or any other Party directly. I 9 However, although the Niue Treaty established a framework for cooperation, and facilitated the sharing of information between the Parties, it did not actually provide a mechanism for Parties to agree on carrying out operations, or include legally binding requirements for the exchange of specific information. Instead, it suggested that Parties could establish 'subsidiary agreements or arrangements,, setting out the details and agreement necessary to cooperate in the provision of personnel, vessels and aircraft and undertake fisheries surveillance and law enforce. ment in each other's waters. And although all 17 of the FFA members are Parties to the Niue Treaty, which has been in force for 20 years, only a very limited nu.mber of 'subsidiary agreements' have been negotiated -and many of those The FF A Vessel Monitoring System. This is a satellite-based system accessible to all FF A members that allows them to track and monitor the position, speed and direction of registered fishing vessels across the region. Noting the 'hiatus' in implementing this aspect of the Vava' u Declaration, Leaders specifically directed that Australia host a meeting of Ministers responsible for both fisheries and law enforcement/justice in 2010 and directed that, at that meeting: agreement is to be reached both on the fonn of new legal arrangements to be negotiated and on a roadmap for the negotiation process, which should conclude no later than the end of 2012. Leaders further instructed that Ministers report back to Leaders on progress at the 20 I 0 Leaders meeting, in the expectation that, at that time, Leaders will be able to endorse proposals put forward by Ministers on the form of arrangements to be negotiated and the details of what areas are to be covered by those arrangements, thereby allowing formal negotiations on the details to begin.35
With the direction and timetable clearly prescribed by Leaders, the Ministers responsible for fisheries and law enforcement/justice met in Canberra in July 2010, and agreed that officials should negotiate a '1nultilateral Niue Treaty Subsidiary Agreement', to strengthen fisheries management in the region and provide a robust legal framework for more integrated, cost-effective and efficient maritime surveillance. 36 M"inisters directed that the work be undertaken by a Drafting Group under the auspices of the Parties to the Niue Treaty and that a draft text be con1pleted by the end of 2012 for consideration and appropriate endorsement by ministers, 37 giving officials notice that they wanted this done, and done quickly. In addition, Australia announced that it had allocated AUD $2.4 million over three years to support the negotiation of the Agreement. 38 Accordingl~ 
Ill. Substance of the Agreemen-t
The Agreement provides a flexible mechanism for · cooperation in two key areas; conducting fisheries surveillance and law enforcement activities, and s.barins fisheries data and intelligence for both fisheries and broader law enforcem(-'llt purposes.
First, . it establishes a legal framework for the conduct of a wide range of cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities. The underlying premise is the establishment of a comprehensive, self-contained system that will · enable the Parties to implement the Agreement and conduct cooperative activities directly, without the need for any further detailed. bilateral or multilateral . arrangem.etits. In order to give effect to this concept, the Agreement establishes an information managem. ent system (the Niue. Treaty Information System), which will be maintained by the Administrator. (the FFA). Parties wi11 provide the authority and infonnation necessary to engage in cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities to the Administrator, through a range of 'notifications'. This authority and . . information will be recorded in the Niue Treaty Information System, where the Parties will be· able to access it-electronically. · Second, the Agreement ,~stablishes ~ minimum standard for the exchange ~f fisheries data and 'intelligence, which will be stored and made available to all Parties in a fisheries information managem.ent system by the Administrator. It also enables the· Parties to share fisheries data and intelligence for broader law enforcement purpo.ses (ineludirtg · with non-fisheries a~enc-ies and broader law The objective and application of the Agreement are broad and· policy-oriented, reflecting the regional a~d operational context in whi9,h it was. negotiated, and the shared ·interests of the FF A members in designing a . legal framework that will achieve practical outcomes. The objective is both ambjtious and purposive: to enhance active participation in cooperative surveill~nce and enforcement activities, with the ultimate purpose of continuously improving fisheries management and It is not geographically limited; cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities may be conducted both within the waters of a Party, 48 or oo the high seas. Nonetheless, should a Party wish to specifically exclude the possibility of such activities taking place in certain of its maritime zones or defined areas, it can elect not to apply the Agreement with respect to those zones or areas by notification to the Administrator. 49 Finally, Part I also establishes the basic mechanisms necessary for the operation of the Agreement: the National Authority, the Administrator, and the Niue Treaty Information System. The concepts of a 'national authority' and an Administrator are not unprecedented. However, in this Agreement these roles have been specifically designed in order to establish a 'self-contained' framework within which the Parties can cooperate without the need to enter into further Jegal arrangements. Accordingly, in addition to tbe usual roles performed by a central authority as a central conta, ct for administering the Agreement, 50 the National Authority has a number of functions pertaining to legal obligations under the Agreement, including submitting and updating the notifications which will provide the information and authority necessary for the conduct of cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities. 51 Similarly, the role of the Administrator will be crucial to the effective operation and implementation of the Agreement, as reflected in the specific direction that the Administrator play an 'active' role in assisting the Parties to achieve the objective of the Agreement. 52 In particular, the Administrator will be responsible for establishing and maintaining the Niue Treaty Information System, in which the authority and information provided through notifications will be recorded and made available as the basis for the conduct of cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities. The term 'waters of a Party' is defined in Article l(p) to llleaJ,l the Exclusive Economic Zone, territorial sea, archipelagic waters and internal waters. Article 3(2). This provision could be used> eg, to exclude areas of overlapping or joint jurisdiction, or areas where th~ relevant coastal states already have alternative arrangements in place for smvetllance and enforcement (such as the Torres Strait Part II establishes the framework for Parties to condu~t coo~erativc surveillance and enforce 1 nent activities under the Agreement, tncludmg the means for requesting and providing assis~ance and. agreeing on the parameters. f~r :h~ conduct of activities. Since a 'cooperative surveillance and enforcement act1v1ty 1s defined as an activity undertaken 4 pursuant to Part II of this Agreement', the possibilities for cooperation are really limited only by the needs and imagination of the Parties (and consistency with domestic and international law). Accordingly, the principles and procedures set out in Article 8 to govern cooperative surveillance and entbrce1nent activities have to be flexible enough to apply to the entire spectrum of potential activities, ranging from on-water enforcement operations invo1ving patrol boats, officers and aircraft, to in-port inspections or transshipment monitodng, provision of mutual legal assistance, and investigation or prosecution of a fisheries offence. The overriding requirements are that all cooperative surveillance and enforcetnent activities must be: consistent with the provisions of the Agreement itself; consistent with any applicable laws, policies or procedures notified or agreed by the relevant Parties; and based on the consent of each Party to the activity. 54 In practice, each Party will provide information through an 'operational requirements notification' SS about:
(i) the applicable laws, policies and procedures for the conduct of cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities in their waters, or using their resources (including operational procedures, use of force procedures, and policies for cost recovery and sharing of fines); and
(ii) the assistance that the Party may be willing to make available for cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities (such as assets, personnel, particular expertise or other assistance).
This information will be provided on a standing basis (and updated as necessary), 56 and stored in the Niue Treaty Information System, so that Parties can access it (including on a real-time basis) to plan and conduct cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities.
Having accessed the information in the Niue Treaty Information System to undertake their planning, Parties will record their consent to a cooperative surveillance and enforcement activity in an 'activity notification'. 57 This must include any particular conditions on the conduct of the activity and be deposited with the Administrator in advance of its commencement. Notably, consent to a cooperative surveillance and enforcement activity can be provided on a standing ?asis ~such as on-going agreement to cooperate in port inspections or the routine notification), or for a specific activity (such as one particular maritime surveillance operation or port inspection).58 .
There are also specific requirements for the actual conduct of cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities, relating to authority, identification, use of force and hot pursuit. Prior to engaging in a cooperative surveiHance and enforcement activity, Parties must . ensure that all personnel and assets are appropriately authorised, and confirm this through notifications. 59 The Assisting Party must ensure that personnel participating iri the activity are appropriately authorised under its national law and inform the Administrator through an 'authorised resources notification',60 and the Requesting Party must ensure that they are cross-vested with relevant powers under its national law and inform the Administrator through a 'cross· vesting notification '. 61 Once authorised, personnel engaged in cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities must be appropriately identified, to ensure ·compliance with national and international law. In addition to the relatively standard requirement of a national identification card, personnel conducting sillveillance and enforcement activities on behalf of another Party must, if requested, produce an extract from the Niue Treaty Information System setting out . the extent of their· cross-vested authority under the laws of the Receiving Party. 62 This extract would be based on the information provided by the Requesting Party in its 'cross-vesting notifi~ation descnoing the authority that may be exercised by authorised personnel on its behalf. This concept uses technology to provide maximum flexibility in the conduct of cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities, while ensuring that an authorised personnel are appropriately idenfifiable. For example, the extract could be printed out from the Niue Treaty Information System in advance of an activity, printed out on board a patrol vessel during the· course of an activity, emailed to a patrol vessel or a fishing vessel by the National Authority or the Administrator, or even shown to a vessel master on an electronic device as an electronic document.
There· is a clear legal framework for the use of force during cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities under the Agreeqient: (ii) any use of force must be consistent with the national laws, policies or procedures agreed in advance, 6 3 and (iii) any use of force must be consistent with ititemational law. 64 Article 8( 4 ). Article 10(2) and (3). Annex C(6).
Annex C(5). Article l l(I)(a). Since the requirements for use of force during a cooperative· surveillance and enforcement activity are likely to differ between Parties, Parties must include infonnation about this in the operational requirements notification submitted to the Administrator pursuant to Article 8(2). In additiont use of force must be agreed between the Parties in· advance of any cooperative suiveillance and enforcement activity using the 'activity notification'. , The Agreement e tablishes the rules to be applied in relation to payment terms and co t recovery for the involvement of resources in cooperative surveillance and enforcen1ent activities,75 as well as the sharing of fines and monies recovered from fisherie offences detected or investigated through cooperation under the Agreement. 76 In both cases, Parties must try resolving these issues through agreement, but there is a default procedure that is to be followed if agreement can not be reached. This is designed to provide as much certainty as possible about the co t that Parties are likely to incur in undertaking a cooperative surveillance and enforcement activity and minimise the potential for disagreement over these issues.
(c) Part 111-Cooperation in sharing fisheries data and : intelligence
Part Ill addresses cooperation in sharing fisheries data and intelligence, giving effect to the direction from. Leaders that the Agreement should enhance cooperation in this area.7 7 As noted above, 'fisheries data and inteUigence' is a distinct category of information under the Agreement; it encompasses any data or intelligence relating to fisheries that is provided or made available pursuant to Part III, which establishing a comprehensive framework. req~1nng aH. Part1~s to exchange. a minimum standard of fisheries data and intelhgence (hsted i~ Annex A) with respect to foreign fishing vessels, domestic fishing vessels auth.onsed to fish on ~he high seas, and the activities of natural or legal pers~ns rel~tlng to those fishmg vessels. 78 All fisheries data and intelligence thus provided w1ll be managed by the Administrator using the information management facility and made available to a11 Parties for fisheries purposes, in accordance with security standards and data sharing protocols adopted by the Forum Fisheries Committee or such other standards and protocols as the Parties to the Agreement may adopt.
The fisheries data and intelligence listed in Annex A were selected on the basis of their importance to support MCS activities, specifically: vessel license lists;
location, activities and movement of fishing vessels (including vessel monitoring system data, observer data, boarding reports, port inspection reports and vessel sighting reports); operational catch and effort data; vessels and persons of interest, and prosecutions, violations and settlements relating to fisheries. Specific requirements are also included with respect to the timing and formats for providing the various types of fisheries data and intelligence. Of interest, Annex A specifies geographic limits so that fisheries data and intelligence need only be provided where it is with respect to, or relevant to, the Party's Exclusive Economic Zone or the high seas in the W estem and Central Pacific Ocean. This limit is necessary to ensure that only the fisheries data and intelligence most relevant to the Parties is provided, and that the extent of data and intelligence that must be provided under the Agreement is manageable and not without limit.
In addition, the Agreement establishes a mechanism for Parties to share fisheries data and intelligence with each other for use in broader law enforcement Consistent with the idea of enhancing active cooperation, the Parties must seek to cooperate with non-Parties to advance the objective of the Agreement, particularly non-Parties that are surveillance and enforcement partners or coastal states and territories in the region. 83 Key surveillance and enforcement partners are likely to include the United States and France, who regularly participate in cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities with the FF A members. 84 The form and nature of cooperation with non-Parties is not limited, and may occur however the Parties see fit (including on an individual or collective basis). The Administrator may facilitate the sharing of information provided, collected or made available under the Agreement with both non-Parties and inter-governmental organisations, provided that the relevant Parties consent. 85 This would enable information to be shared not only with surveillance and enforcement partners, but potentially with regional law enforcement agencies or other relevant intergovernmental organisations (ranging, for example, from the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police to the WCPFC).
Although the Agreement provides a mechanism for the Parties to meet, 86 in light of the numerous existing fora in which FF A members already meet 
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regularly,87 the Parties are encouraged to use electronic meru:is as ~uch as possible for the impletnentation and operation of the Agreement, 1nclud1ng through the distribution of circulars by the Administrator, and the taking of decisions by electronic means. To facilitate this, the Agreement establishes a specific method for taking a decision electronically, whereby if no Party has objected to a proposed decision within a thirty-day period, it is deemed to have been adopted. 88 However, if one or more objections are notified during that period, the proposed decision is not deemed to be either accepted or rejected, but will be considered at the next meeting of the Parties. This process has the benefit of enabling simple and efficient electronic agreement if possible~ while providing flexibility for a proposed decision to 'be referred for discussion at a meeting of the Parties if necessary.
Since the Annexes form an integral part of the Agreement, the requirements detailed in the Annexes (such as the fisheries data and intelligence to be provided under Part III, listed in Annex A, and the information and authority to be provided in notifications, listed in Annex C) have the same legally binding status as the text within the Articles of the Agreement. 89 Nonetheless, since they may need to be amended or updated more regularly than other provisions of the Agreement (to reflect changing operational needs or technological developments, and ensure that the Agreement operates as effectively as possible) there is a simplified amendment procedure for the Annexes. 90 Once again, this procedure, which is a combinatjon of electronic decision-making and 'tacit acceptance', is designed to enable simple and efficient electronic agreement if possible, while providing flexibility for the Parties to meet and discuss a proposed amendment if necessary. Accordingly, amendments to the Annex.es may be proposed at any time in writing to the Administrator, 91 and must be adopted by consensus.92 There is a sixty. .. day period within which, if any Party notifies an objection to the proposed amendment, it will be deemed to have been rejected. However, if two or more Parties so request in writing, the proposed amendment will neither considered to be adopted nor rejected, but will be considered at the next meeting of the Parties. In practice, the electronic process .is likely to apply principally for simple amendments, while any more complex or technical proposals might require discussion at a meeting of the Parties. For example, rather than simply accepting or rejecting. an ame~dme?t as proposedi a P~ may wish to propose slightly different amendments. This might be most effective y ac 1eved through discussion at a meeting of the Parties, rather than repeated circulation of alternative electronic proposals. Once adopted an amendment to an Annex enters into force sixty days following adoption (without the need for ratification, acceptance or approval). 93 The Agreement is subject to ratification; approval or acceptance by the signatories, 94 and will enter into force following the fourth ratification, acceptance or approval. 95 However, only states that are Party to the Niue Treaty (or a territory of a state which is Party to the Niue Treaty which has been so authorised by the Government of the state which is internationally responsible for it )96 may become Party to the Agreement, unless all the Parties to the Agreement otherwise agree.
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IV. 'Innovative features' of the Agreement The Agreement bas been described as having 'innovative features that reflect and promote key developments in international law in the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing' ,98 and a number of themes emerge from the overview of the Agreement above which give strength to this observation. First, the Agreement establishes a self-contained system, which goes beyond simply describing a legal 'framework' and provides a detailed, _ prescriptive mechanism that the Parties can use to 'op. erationalise' the cooperative activities that it envisages. Second, it makes a wide range of flexible and innovative types of cooperation available to the Parties, on an 'opt-in' basis that seeks to actively facilitate cooperation, but does not mandate it. And third, it makes practical use of current and emerging tools and technologies to maximise the effectiveness of the Parties' limited resources and their jurisdiction under intemational law.
(a) A self-contained system. for cooperation
The idea of cooperative surveillance and enforcement is not new -it was a key element of the Niue Treaty over twenty years ago. However, providing a legal framework allowing Parties to enter into cooperative activities is not enough; consideration . must also be given to how the Parties will actually implement the framework and give it operational effect. At the most basic level, this is a question Article 26(3). In contrast, amendments to the Agreement itself do require ratification, acceptance or approval, and do not enter into force until the Administrator has received such instrmnents from all Parties-(see Article 27(3)). However, Article 27(5) provides that the Parties will, to the extent possible, apply the amendment provisionally This will enable Parties to benefit from amended or updated provisions as soon as possible, while acknowledging that it may take some time for all Parties to finalise the domes ti~ procedures necessary to ratify, approve or accept an amendment to the Agreement.
Article 28(2). Article 29(1).
This provision applies with respect to !okelau,, which is a non-se~f .. governing territory of New Zealand and does not have an mtetnational legal personality separate from that of~ew Zeal~. H?wev:r, To~elau participates fully and in its own right in a range of regi.~nal orgaruzattons including the FF A e: <http://www. mfat. govt.n7.l'Co"Untries/ Pac1ficffokelau.php>. , Article 28( l ), (3) and {4 ). of how the legal authority required to carry o~t a cooperative ~tivity will be given d e c· rded (tot exan'lple how one Party will formally authonse another Party to ~ 0~1 enforcement activities and .exercise j~sdiction in i~ waters o~ on its bebali). Beyond this there are a 1nyr1ad of other issues on which the Parties to a cooperative actjvity will need to agree, ranging from the p~ocedur.s for t~e use of force~ and the comn1and and control of assets, to the authonty that is exercisable by cross-vested personnel and the procedures that must be followed to carry out a boarding and inspection operation. In the Niue Treaty, actual cooperation is dependent on the Parties entering into further subsidiary agreements in order to provide the requisite consent and agree on these other issues.99 This leaves a great deal of uncertainty with respect to a wide range of operational issues including command and control, the extent of authority) the use of force and the conduct of hot pursuit, all of which need to be resolved before any active cooperation can take place. In practice, this level of legal uncertainty is likely to be outside the comfort zone of the fisheries officers usually responsible for organizing cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities, which is reflected in the sm.all number of subsidiary agreements which have been concluded.loo As a result, the lack of prescription in the Niue Treaty itself has reduced its use and effectiveness, and led to the majority of regional surveillance and enforcement operations being managed outside the Niue Treaty framework.101 In contrast this Agreement is intended to establish a comprehensive self-contained system for cooperatio. n in fisheries surveillance and law enforcement, which will enable the Parties to implement this Agreement directly, without the need for any further detailed bilateral or multilateral arrangements .
. To ~o this, . the A~eeroe~t establishes two key concepts: the system of notifications which Parties will use to provide the authority and information n~cessary to conduct ~ooperative surveillance and enforcement activities, and the Niue Treaty lnform~tton System in which this information and authority will be store~ and m~de avatl~ble. These two concepts are designed to ensure that authority and 1nfonnan.on required under the Agreement is properly giv -e Second, notifications provide the "authority" that will constitute the legal basis for the conduct of such activities (such as permission to exercise enforcement jurisdiction in the waters of another Party, or to continue hot pursuit into the territorial sea of another Party).103 Accordingly, the form and content of the notifications is very important. In order to ensure that the extent of the authority provided through any notification is clear, and that the information is provided to a consistent standard, Annex C prescribes the form in which the various notifications required under the Agreement must be submitted.10 4 The Agreement is drafted broadly enough to provide for notifications to be submitted in either paper or electronic fo~ but over time it is likely that this process will be integrated into the Niue Treaty Information System, so that information can be provided through online submission or direct electronic entry.
The information and authority provided in notifications will be stored and made available in the Niue Treaty Information System, which will be a secure, searchable online information management system, accessible by the Parties in real-time. 105 Parties will be able to access the infonnation in this System to make plans for, request assistance with, or consent to engage in cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities. In addition, authorised personnel will be able to use the System in the course of a cooperative surveillance . and enforcement activity (including to verify relevant laws, policies and procedures, seek additional authority, or print out extracts confirming the cross-vested authority of authorised officers).
How will this operate in practice? A Requesting Party will search the information in the System to see what assistance might be available from potential Assisting Parties to meet their particular needs, and any applicable conditions or laws, policies and procedures of the Assisting Party. Having ascertained what assistance it needs, the Requesting Party can discuss and· agree on the parameters of the activity with the relevant Assisting Party, record this in an activity notification and submit it to the Administrator for inclusion in the Niue Treaty Information System. The legal authority for the Parties to conduct the activity is then provided by the Agreemen~ itse~f, as stated in ~icle 7(4): 'the authority provided by each Party through nobficatlons to the Admm1strator shall constitute a legal basis for the cond~ct of the activities .au~orised, requested or approved therein'. By providing a sufficient level of prescnpt1on, supported by a central repository of infonnation and authority, .this self-i;ontained s.ystem aims to o~er~ome the problems of the past, and establish a legal and practical framework with.in which Parties will be able to actively cooperate with ease and confidence. by enabhng Parties to select the specific assistance they will offer or seek and the ~onditions laws, policies or proc-edures which will apply, and to access this information to plan and conduct cooperative activities. This 'opt-in' system is also likely to make it easier for countries to ratify or accede to the Agreement, since the only direct obligation that they would assume on becoming Party is to provide the min_imum standard of fisheries data and intelligence required under Article 19. It also allows the Agreement to include a range of additional features, which Parties may choose whether or not to use, depending on their individual needs, interests, laws, policies and procedures.
_ The ftrst of these is the possibility for Parties to request a wide range of assistance under the Agreement, extending well beyond the traditional realm of 'joint patrols' · involving' vessels, aircraft and personnel. The 'operational requirements notification, 1 06 requires each Party to list the types of assistance that it may make available as part of a cooperative surveillance and enforcement activity, within the categories of 'monitoring', 'control' and 'surveillance'. In addition to the standard areas such as aerial and at-sea patrols, Parties could offer assistance in the form of training,. such as how to analyse compliance data, conduct boarding and inspection operations, or collect and manage evidence. Alternatively, Parties may be able to provide personnel with relevant expertise, such as MCS analysts or trained observers, ·or to help with the establishment of a vessel monitoring system or vessel registry and licensing system. Since the types of assistance . which max be offered or req11ested are not limited, this flexible framework will also be able to evolve over time to meet the needs and priorities of aspects of the traditional doctrine of hot pursuit are .largely founded on assumptions better suited to the era of local fisheries, three-mile territorial seas, and observation by long glass than to the current era characterized by distant-water fleets of factory trawlers, 200-mile exclusive economic zones, and observation by radar, aerial photography, underwater sensors and satellites. 122 In this regard, the Agreement seeks to give a good faith interpretation to the requirements of the 'traditional doctrine' encapsulated in Article 111 of the UN CLOS, while enabling Parties to make full use of modem tools and technology.
Article 13( 4) of the Agreement provides that hot pursuit commences when the appropriate authorities have good reason to believe that a vessel has violated the laws of the Party within whose waters the vessel is detected (either based upon direct visual contact, or evidence obtained by 'reliable technical means'), and a clear signal to stop has been given to the vessel. Similarly, Article 13(5) provides that hot pursuit shall be deemed to have continued without interruption, provided that continual positive identification and tracking of the pursued vessel is maintained by resources authorised under this Agreement by the Party in whose waters the vessel was detected, including by either direct visual contact, or 'reliable technical means' .
Consistent with Article 111(1) of the UNCLOS, these provisions require that: (i) the vessel be located within the relevant Party' s waters; (ii) the Party have a ' good reason to believe' the vessel has violated relevant laws; (iii) a clear signal to stop is given; and (iv) the pursuit be continued without interruption. However, the Agreement provides for the authorities to base their belief that a vessel has violated the laws of the coastal state, and to maintain positive identification and tracking, on the basis of 'reliable technical means~. While this term is not defined, it would presumably include vessel monitoring systems, satellite images or radar, or any other forms of reliable technology that may be developed -such as unmanned aerial vehicles, for example. This functional approach, 123 which is similar to a provision in a bilateral Australia-France fisheries enforcement treaty, 124 arguably strikes a workable balance between the strict textual requirements of the UN CLOS and the practical reality of fisheries surveillance and enforcement in the 21 ;. century. which wi~l enable notifications to be updated as re.quired to reflect new tools and technologies. Vo/ 31 In addition, the Agreement requires that positive tracking and identification be maintained hy resources 'authorized under this Agreement by the Party in whose waters the vessel was detected' )25 ln light of the flexible opt~ons for cooperative surveillance and enfo.rcement provided in the Agree. ment, tlus could potentially include n,0t only the resources of that Party, but p ersonnel from an Assist-ing Party or Ff A personnel located in the Regional Fisheries and Surveillance Centre, provided they are appropriately authorised by the relevant coastal state pursuant to Article 1 o. Combined with the ability to harness 'reliable technical means•) this approach · could have enormous practical benefits) in a. region of vast maritime zones containing valuable natural resources belonging to countries w. ith very limited enforcement assets~ For example, it has re<;ently bee~ reported that Palau (which bas an exclusive economic z-0ne of around 630,000 km-and only one patrol boat) plans to use drones to monitor its commercial fishing ban -a development which allows further food for thought regarding the potential use to which this provision could be put.126
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V. Process of negotiating the Agreement
Finally, it. is useful to briefly describe the process that was used to develop the Agreement because, although commonly understood in a domestic context, it was rather unusual in . an international treaty negotiation (and may provide a useful template for others to consider).
(a) The circumstances: commitment, common interest and costs
I~ is important to begin by noting SO'fne of the key 'enabling' circumstances for these . negotiations. First, as discussed above, there was a . clear politi. cal commitment at the most senior level of all the Governments involved, in the form of specific instructions from both Ministers and Leaders. Since Ministers had also endorsed a set of 'principles and key elements' to be included in the Agreement, officials were able to get directly to work on the substance of the Agreement, without the need for lengthy negotiations on its scope> object or purpose.
Second~ the countries invo~ved share common interests and already have close working relationships, particularly between their fisheries agencies whose officials meet frequently in a variety of fora. This -enabled meetings to be sdbeduled without too-much difficulty _(other than the usual Pacific fisheries dilemma. of fitting additional meetings into an already overcrowded calendar without keeping people away from home for too long).
T~rd, specific _ fundi~~ was made available for the negotiations, through a commitment of $2.4 million. from the Australian Governm ·. enhsts-drones-to-enforce-commercial-fishing-ba.n,I 11 5 026~~~i
tam/pac1fic-beat/palau
